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The Desperate Rebels of Shimabara: The Economic and Political
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Abstract

The Shimabara Rebellion has been studied throughout history by historians of East Asia. Originally conceived
by both Japanese and Western scholars as a religious revolt against the anti-Christian Tokugawa government,
later scholars contended that the Rebellion was a demonstration by the mistreated and impoverished and only
tacitly related to Christian influences. This paper sets out to build on that narrative and to show the
connection between the Christian resistance to the Tokugawa government and the movement of
impoverished and desperate peasants, pushed to the brink of existence. Furthermore, this paper hopes to
explore the goals of the Rebellion and establish the Shimabara Rebellion within the context of other rebellions
during the Tokugawa era.
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The Shimabara Rebellion from 1637 to 1638 remains one
of the most historically divisive events in Japanese early modern
history.

The Rebellion threw the Shimabara and Amakusa

provinces on the far south of Japanese islands into outright revolt
against their lords, and, later, against the army of the shogunate
itself.

The cause of the Rebellion remains a popular

historiographical debate into the modern day. Some contend that
the sizeable, if still minority, population of Japanese Christians in
these distant provinces revolted in order to overthrow a
government whose public policy included the persecution, torture,
and execution of Christians.

Others argue that economic

oppression forced the peasants into revolt against irresponsible
daimyo, or local lords, with the Christian element being
overplayed in historical records. Neither of these interpretations
fully captures the nature of the Shimabara Rebellion. Tokugawa
Japan, even after the Rebellion, maintained a long tradition of
peasant resistance to the domination by the daimyo through
109

petitions, inactivity, and even outright violence.

Economic

hardship and political persecution undoubtedly pressured peasants
into rebellion against their lords in Shimabara and Amakusa.
However, Christian influences in these regions tied together the
revolt of farmers, unemployed soldiers, and other classes. The
Shimabara Rebellion was not a peasants’ revolt against unjust
taxation or a Christian uprising.

The Rebellion was the last

measure of a desperate people, pushed together by a common
economic suffering and held together by a common culture
marked, but not consumed, by Japanese Christianity. After the
Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate’s persecution of Christianity
was a concentrated effort to cut or replace these cultural and
religious ties in order to end the threat of any future powerful and
unified revolts.

The shogunate’s reaction reveals how they

recognized the multiple causes of the Rebellion and used the
experience to prevent future insurrections.
In order to properly understand how the Shimabara arose,
historians must be aware not just of the economic and religious
environment, but also of the common practices of the peasant
class.

Although the Tokugawa era was characterized by

administrative and government domination, the chonin, or middle
to lower classes, still maintained some ability to resist unilateral
domination by their daimyo.

Peasants eventually submitted to

social immobility and high taxes from their lords; however, they
were still able to influence local policy. Often, in instances of bad
110

farming or famine, peasants requested exemption or lowering of
the tax rate. 185 While the daimyo had no legal obligation to act on
these peasant demands, their acceptance hinted at a local
relationship more flexible than the national tax-collecting policy.
Despite the heavy cost demands of the upkeep of estate, personal
castle, and lavish lifestyle, daimyo were more willing to negotiate
with peasants than to risk a costly revolt. Often these appeals were
conducted through village headmen and the wealthy farming
families who sought to retain a greater amount of surplus crop. 186
However, increased tax burdens most heavily affected the poorer
farming families, who could be driven to starvation in years of bad
harvest. As a result, some of these poor farmers threatened to
abandon their land, leaving the domain’s agricultural base without
its primary labor force.

In the pursuit for concessions, the

headsman used typical honorifics and appeals to their “benevolent
lordship,” laced with dissatisfaction over the lord’s administration.
In extreme cases, peasant classes chanced open revolt when their
daimyo ignored petitions and refused any concessions.

Only

twenty years after the bloody Shimabara Rebellion, peasants under
the Kurume administration in southern Japan violently revolted
when their lord refused to lower “unheard of taxes” and every

185

Donald Burton, “Peasant Movements in Early Tokugawa Japan,” Peasant
Studies, 8, no. 3 (Summer 1979), accessed February 20, 2015, 62. Historical
Abstracts.
186
Ibid., 65.
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demand by the peasants. 187
As a result, typically the daimyo and the shogunate opted to
appease the peasant population instead of having to crush outright
rebellion. 188 Daimyo that lost control over their peasant population
were often replaced and dishonored by their administrative failure.
Through this policy of mutual responsibility, the chief concerns of
the daimyo shifted from collecting as much as possible from the
peasant population to maintaining peace and order in their domain.
Although the exploitation of peasants through poll taxes,
agricultural taxes, and more continued, daimyo made concessions
and tax breaks to avoid the humiliation of a revolt. The complicity
of the law was better assured when the peasants respected their
lord and believed they would receive fair treatment. For example,
even after the brutally repressed Shimabara Rebellion, peasants hid
their rice from tax collectors in Bizan. 189 Efficient tax collection
was easier and better guaranteed through appeasement, not force.
Tokugawa era daimyo exploited the peasantry, but the peasantry
retained an agency to defy absolute domination.

187

Ibid.,67.
Daimyo and the shogunate maintained a feudal relationship not unlike that of
kings and lords in Europe. The shogunate was the ultimate military and political
authority. The shogun and his advisors directed military operations on a grand
scale and controlled national legislature. The daimyo received their lands by the
authority of the shogun and, as such, were subservient to his demands and
interests. They were expected to maintain order in their territory, collect taxes
for the shogunate, and provide grand demonstrations of loyalty to the shogun
through parades to the capitol of Edo.
189
Burton, “Peasant Movements,” 67.
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Many historians have discussed the Shimabara Rebellion in
detail, primarily focusing on the causes of the revolt.

Older

research tended to place the blame on the harsh anti-Christian
policies enacted by the daimyo. Neil Fujita and Joseph Sebes both
attributed the rebellion as an outburst of persecuted Japanese
Christians, joined by hidden Christians who had been “forced to
apostatize” through torture and intimidation.

190

Japanese

Christians were a significant minority in southern Japan.
Originally, daimyo had forced their peasantry to convert to
Christianity in order to attract European ships and the goods they
carried, particularly guns.

Although the demand for guns

significantly lessened once the Tokugawa shogunate stiffened its
control over the nation, many of the peasants remained committed
to their newfound religion.

Reports of the Rebellion, from

European and Japanese sources, detailed the rebels’ use of
Christian symbols and banners. However, Fujita and Sebes’ theory
relied on a much larger population of Japanese Christians than
actually existed in Kyushu. More realistically, modern historians
relied on the tradition and accounts of peasant rebellions to explain
the Rebellion. 191 Using research by historians such as Donald
Burton and Geoffrey Parker, more recent narratives explained the
190

Joshua Sebes, “Christian Influences on the Shimabara Rebellion 1637-1638,”
Archivum historicum Societatis Iesu, no. 48 (1978), 142. Historical Abstracts.
191
Fujita and Sebes are both authors and religious historians. Although their
research is valuable, their interpretation is skewed with an examination of the
Shimabara Rebellion through a Christian lens.
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Shimabara Rebellion as a peasants’ revolt against political injustice
and unbearable taxation. Geoffrey Gunn explicitly described this
version of events as “refreshingly modern.” 192 However, to simply
disregard the well-documented Christian element of the Rebellion
does not fully explore the origins of the Shimabara Rebellion, nor
explain the harsh reprisals against Christianity following the
Rebellion. 193 Recently, more historians have rejected both the
Christian uprising and peasant revolt narratives, entertaining the
idea that both elements substantially influenced the Rebellion.
Ohashi Yukihiro, a younger and newer historian, even explored
how the opposing narratives of the Shimabara Rebellion were
developed by historians after concluding that multiple elements of
social hierarchy and cohesion, religious persecution, and economic
despotism made the Rebellion possible.

Ultimately, historians

have increasingly accepted that there is no singular cause, and have
begun to explore how the memory of the Shimabara Rebellion was
created to simplify the historical narrative and foist the blame for
civil unrest on the small minority of Japanese Christians.
In Shimabara and Amakusa, economic pressures were so
dire as to require these methods of resistance. Many peasants
complained of heavy taxes and of difficulty living.
192

Wealthier

Geoffrey Gunn, “The Duarte Correa manuscript and the Shimabara
Rebellion,” Crossroads, no. 6 (1998), 12. Found in Crossroads Website.
193
Burton, Parker, and Gunn are historians and professors focused on East Asia
and Japan. Their interpretation reflects the secularization of history and an
attempt to fit the Shimabara Rebellion into a larger pattern of peasant rebellions.
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farmers could not retain as much surplus and poor farmers risked
starvation under the new Shimabara lord. 194 The previous lord,
who had also burdened the population with persecution of
Christianity and heavy taxes, had died suddenly, leaving his
inexperienced son to continue his unpopular policies. Peasants in
Amakusa suffered similarly and this heavy economic oppression
irked many of the farmers, both wealthy and poor. 195 Duarte
Correa, a Portuguese sea captain-turned-Jesuit, recorded that the
peasants of Amakusa were forced to pay the annual tribute in
wheat, rice, and barley as well as two additional imposts.
Furthermore, Correa asserted that the peasantry was expected to
serve the daimyo in every way possible, such as supplying
firewood to their lord’s soldiers. 196 While Correa’s testimony is
steeped in bias, as a secret Catholic missionary, these claims
leveled against the lords of Shimabara and Amakusa are supported
by their inexperience and youth. 197

Additionally, extravagant

spending by the daimyo was typically expected, from the expenses

194

Ohashi Yukihiro, trans. Martin Ramos, “The Revolt of ShimabaraAmakusa,” Bulletin of Portuguese-Japanese Studies, no. 20 (2010), 74.
Historical Abstracts.
195
Gunn, “Duarte Correa,” 7.
196
Ibid., 12.
197
Correa, as a Portuguese Jesuit, looked to avoid placing the blame of the
rebellion on Christianity itself. Rather, he blamed the faulty administration of
the daimyo in order to clear Christianity of most responsibility of the Rebellion.
Ultimately, his efforts fell short as the Tokugawa bakufu cited the Rebellion as a
major Christian uprising and banned Christianity from Japan. Correa was later
imprisoned for his Portuguese ethnicity and Christian faith in Nagasaki, tortured,
and burned to death.
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of sankin kotai to the costs of maintain their castle, dress, and other
status symbols. 198 Being inexperienced daimyo, these two lords
may have been overwhelmed by their administrative and social
duties and resorted to raising taxes to procure the appropriate
funds. However, through the eyes of the peasants, these daimyo
openly exploited their peasant class in order to enhance their own
personal wealth. Most accounts claim that the Shimabara lord
used most of the collected taxes in order to fund the building of his
new Shimabara castle at the expense of the farming class.
Furthermore, the lords punctuated these economic injustices with
acts of political terror and torture. Peasants unable to supply taxes
were beaten, drowned, and killed on the administration’s orders.199
These economic and political abuses created a highly volatile
sentiment among the commoner classes, especially the farmers.
These economic and political injustices were compounded
by the religious persecution enacted by both the state and local
governments. Since Toyotomi Hideoyoshi’s reign, the government
had, at least on paper, opposed the expansion and continued
presence of Christianity in Japan. In 1587, Hideyoshi declared that
any lord who wanted to become a “follower of the padres (priests)”
of their own volition could do so and also convert their fief, only
198

Sankin kotai is the law of necessary expeditions to and prolonged stays at the
shogunate’s castle in Edo. The daimyo were expected to make this trip at least
annually and maintain an impressive home worthy of their title. The intention of
sankin kotai was to keep daimyo from building too much personal wealth and to
bring them close under the watchful eye of the shogunate.
199
Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74.
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prohibiting some of the wealthier and more influential fief owners
from doing so. 200 However, in the same year, Hideyoshi also
expelled the missionaries from Japan and denounced his vassals
who had convinced the peasants of their fief to convert as well.201
Christianity had first arrived in southern Japan in the mid 1500’s,
brought in force by Portuguese missionaries and later by Christian
Dutch and British merchant companies. As evidenced in Samurai
William, these Southern lords employed a number of methods to
attract European trading company ships. 202 Acting independently
of the daimyo, some lords converted to Christianity to attract the
European merchants to their cities, or at least provided Christian
missionaries with access to the countryside and peasant population.
Some peasants converted upon their lord’s conversion to
Christianity while others were convinced by the preaching of the
Christian priests. Japanese Christians never became a majority in
southern Japan, but did account for a sizeable minority of the
population.
Although Christianity was still, to some extent, prevalent in
200

Toyotomi Hideyoshi, “Limitation on the Propagation of Christianity, 1587,”
in Japan: A Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa
Period, ed. David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 196.
201
Toyotomi Hideyoshi, “Expulsion of the Missionaries, 1587,” in Japan: A
Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa Period, ed.
David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 197.
202
Giles Milton, Samurai William (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2002), 182.
In the case of the British East India Company, King Foyne of Hirado
demonstrated his hospitality in the form of food and prostitutes provided for the
crew of the Clove. King Foyne won over the British East India Company and
Hirado became the location the English factory.
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Kyushu in the early 1600’s under the first Tokugawa shogun,
Tokugawa Ieyasu, the succeeding shoguns harshly condemned the
foreign religion.

203

During the early Tokugawa shogunate,

Christianity experienced a “dramatic decline,” likely due to the
shogunate’s increasing alienation and restriction of European
influences during the Edo period. 204 Christianity was only truly
valued for the trade, specifically guns, it brought in from European
merchants; with the pacification of Japan under Tokugawa Ieyasu,
there was a decreased demand for guns and a significant decreased
value on trade with the European Christians. Christian faith was
considered a crime.

This policy was not entirely unique to

Christianity, as unpopular Buddhist sects and families of disloyal
retainers received similar treatment.

Regardless, hundreds of

Christians were executed in Kyoto in 1619 and in Nagasaki in
1622. 205 Records of Christians being imprisoned, decapitated, and
burned alive characterized the shogunate’s attitude towards
Japanese Christians. 206 Even more graphic executions included
crucifixion, water torture, mutilation, and “suspending the prisoner
head down over a pit of excrement.”

Many of the Japanese

Christians recanted to avoid punishment while others were driven
203

Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 73.
Peter Nosco, “Early Modernity and the State’s Policies toward Christianity in
16th and 17th Century Japan,” Bulletin of Portuguese Japanese Studies, no. 7
(2003), 12. Historical Abstracts.
205
Ibid., 12.
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Fujita, “Persecution by Tokugawa Bakufu,” in Japan’s Encounter with
Christianity: the Catholic mission in pre-modern Japan (New York, NY: Paulist
Press, 1991), 175-177.
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into underground groups. 207 The Tokugawa bakufu’s desire for
control, stability, and order compelled it to attempt to quash
Christianity. 208 The Era of the Warring States, characterized by
near constant civil war across Japan by competing warlords, was
over and there was no longer any need for trade with the
Europeans.

To emphasize the point, two years before the

Shimabara Rebellion, the Tokugawa shogunate issued an edict
barring the Catholic priests from Japan, demanding that its
citizenry report any found padres, and promised to put to death any
Japanese returning from overseas. 209 Christianity had outstayed its
welcome in Tokugawa Japan, as the bakufu sought to consolidate
its control over its population’s personal and religious lives. Zen
Buddhism was becoming a national religion used to encourage
loyalty and subservience among the peasantry and to reinforce
Tokugawa authority instead of opposing it. 210 In the eyes of the
shogunate, Christianity had outlived its usefulness and had become
a cause of disorder in the religious conflict it provoked.
At the local level, the Shimabara and Amakusa lords

207

Tetsuya Ohama, “Christianity in the Edo Period,” in A History of Japanese
Religion, ed. Kazuo Kasahara, trans. Paul McCarthy and Gaynor Sekimori
(Tokyo, Japan: Kosei Publishing Company, 2001), 437.
208
The bakufu was the military and political government administrated by the
Tokugawa shogun.
209
Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Edict of 1653 Ordering the
Closing of Japan: Addressed to the Joint Bugyo of Nagasaki,” in Japan: A
Documentary History: The Dawn of History to the Late Tokugawa Period, ed.
David Lu (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), 221.
210
Nosco, “Early Modernity,” 12-13.
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engaged in the persecution of Christians in the same manner as the
shogunate. This process was very common in domains formerly
controlled by Christian daimyo. 211 In a later letter to shogunate
forces, one rebel claimed that their only wish was to practice
Christianity without repression. 212 Although this demand was not
universal for the Shimabara rebels, a significant percentage of
Japanese Christians lived in constant fear of being arrested and
executed for their religion.

The Shimabara and Amakusa

repressions of Christianity worsened an already toxic relationship
between the daimyo and their peasants.
This common suffering of the Shimabara and Amakusa
peasants, both Christians and non-Christians, was pushed to a
breaking point by 1637 CE. The peasants of Shimabara revolted,
attacking the lord’s tax officials and men.

The peasants,

merchants, craftsmen, and unemployed soldiers of Amakusa
followed, as joined the rebellion out of choice or force. These
rebels converged on Hara Castle to reform and organize,
appointing the 16-year old Amakusa Shiro as their “leader.” 213

211

While many Southern lords had converted their fiefs to Christianity to garner
European trade, many were replaced or forced out by the Tokugawa bakufu.
The later non-Christian daimyo, eager to prove their loyalty to the Tokugawa
shogunate, became unpopular in these regions because of their persecution of
Christianity.
212
Ohashi, “Revolt of Shimabara-Amakusa,” 74.
213
In reality, it is much more likely that Shiro was more of a figurehead while
the rebel ronin decided on tactics and war plans. Shiro’s youth and the initial
success of the rebellion imply that more experienced warriors planned the
military aspect of the rebellion.
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Hara Castle was besieged by Tokugawa forces but their initial
attempts to crush the rebels failed. After almost four months, the
Tokugawa forces starved the rebels of food, resources, and
ammunition.

Hara Castle fell and the Tokugawa forces

exterminated almost all of the participating rebels.

After the

massacre, the shogunate issued edicts expelling and banning all
Europeans, except for the Dutch at Nagasaki, and reinforcing the
outlaw of Christianity in Japan. After the Rebellion, Christianity
was affixed with a permanent stigma of violence, disorder, and
disrespect for proper authority. The Tokugawa shogunate issued
propaganda portraying Christianity as impure and inappropriate
while also promising rewards to those who reported Christian
practitioners. 214 Japanese Christians were forced underground to
hide their religion and the Tokugawa shogunate eliminated
Japanese Christianity as what they perceived as a threat.
Although historians like Fujita or Gunn argue whether
economic or religious oppression was more significant in pushing
the Tokugawa peasantry to revolt, the Rebellion was much more
complicated. The communities of Shimabara and Amakusa were
tightly knit, tied together by a common culture. Christianity had
its largest base for support in southern Japan, and Japanese

214

Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Five-Household Group Laws
from Shimo Sakurai Village (1640),” in Voices of Early Modern Japan:
Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of the Shoguns, ed.
Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012), 84.
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Christians made up a significant percentage of the population.
Although public acts of torture and execution were intended to
horrify and scare the populace into submission, at the time, local
daimyo could only safely employ it in moderation. By overusing
these methods, the daimyo pushed the population past the breaking
point, to where they were convinced that they were more safe
revolting than continuing under the daimyo’s rule.

Japanese

Christians and non-Christian peasants were tied together by the
communal need to survive. In times of famine or bad harvests, the
village headmen, regardless of their religion, campaigned for lower
tax rates, tax breaks, and exemptions.

Regardless of their

differences in religion, wealth, or social status, the peasantry pulled
together in times of extreme despotism with the intention of
forcing improvement in their standard of living. In their struggle
to survive, the agricultural base had created a community that
relied on each other to demand concessions from the state
authority.
Additionally,

although

only

Christians

were

being

persecuted for religious reasons, every member of the commoner
class was being exploited economically and oppressed politically.
In an effort to both help fund the reconstruction of Edo’s walls and
to build his own Shimabara Castle, Shigemasa Matsukura, the new
lord, imposed heavy taxes and developed strict penalties for the
farmers who failed to provide. Many of these taxes seem almost
ridiculous to modern thinking, such as taxes for the death of a
122

family member. Families unable to pay their taxes were starved,
beaten, tortured, or killed. The mothers and daughters of these
families were sold into brothels.
forthcoming.
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Concessions were not

The economic and political oppression unified the

peasantry into a culture of suffering, one in which mutual
dependence was essential.
Economic grievances played a significant role in the start
of the Rebellion. The unbearable taxes and system of punishments
pushed the peasantry to desperate measures.

As the lifestyle

became more and more untenable, the peasants turned to their own
and implemented the only option left available to resist: open
rebellion.

At its very least, revolt attracted the attention, and

displeasure, of the shogunate. In some ways, the peasant revolt
can be interpreted as a Pyrrhic victory, mutually assured
destruction for both the rebels and the daimyo. In previous cases,
daimyo were dishonored and removed from office as punishment
for failing to maintain peace in their domain.

Political and

economic despotism forced peasants to drastic actions. The close
bonds between the community, strengthened by a common culture
and common “suffering,” assured that the rebels organized,
mobilized, and, largely remained loyal to each other.
The Shimabara Rebellion was an incredibly costly
challenge to Tokugawa authority.

215

Fujita, “Persecution,” 184.
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The rebels raided armories,

killed Tokugawa soldiers, and forced a lengthy siege.

More

importantly, the Rebellion embarrassed the bakufu; although the
peasantry was incited against their daimyo, these commoners-inarms managed to occupy a castle, repulse, and kill trained
military. 216 In short, the Shimabara Rebellion was not a mistake
the shogunate could allow to happen again. To prevent another
uprising of the similar nature, the Tokugawa shogunate devoted
itself to the expulsion and elimination of Christianity in the
domains. By foisting the blame on the Japanese Christians, the
shogunate could divide the communities in southern Japan where
Christians were still a significant minority.
The Tokugawa shogunate employed a more developed and
systematic persecution of Christians. Propaganda was specifically
designed to demonize the European Christian missionaries. In one
chapbook, the Christian “padre” is described more like a goblin
than human, with the intention of taking over Japan. 217 These
depictions were intended to scare Japanese away from interaction
with Christianity and to create a connotation between Christianity
and evil. However, this propaganda piece also did much more.
The Buddhist monk ultimately prevents the spread of the priest’s
“screeching,” juxtaposing the wild and uncivilized image of the
216

Sebes, “Christian Influences on the Shimabara Rebellion,” 143.
Unknown Authors, excerpts from Kirishitan Monogatari (1639), in Voices of
Early Modern Japan: Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of
the Shoguns, ed. Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012),
202.
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Christian padre with the calm wisdom and loyalty of the Buddhist
monk.

By denigrating Christianity, this excerpt elevates Zen

Buddhism which was quickly becoming the Tokugawa’s influence
on religion.

Kirishitan also legitimized the reprisals of the

shogunate against Christianity; in this text, the shogun has the
moral right to destroy their temples and punish those that remain
Christian. 218 The shogunate certainly exercised this right more
frequently and publicly after the rebellion. While the previous
executions had been sporadic and scattered, the shogunate
enforced stricter laws ordering the population to report Japanese
Christians.

One set of Household Laws from 1640 includes

numerous charges to investigate and report any Christian activities.
All villagers were also required to report to the “pertinent temple,”
as Zen Buddhist temples took over the responsibility of ensuring
the Tokugawa shogunate’s control over its citizens’ religions.
Tokugawa officials assumed these laws would be followed,
because if Christians were discovered by these officials, the entire
village would be punished. 219 One edict ordered by the Tokugawa
senior counselors in 1639 captures the spirit of this policy:
With regard to those who believe in
Christianity, you are aware that there
is a proscription, and thus knowing,
you are not permitted to allow padres
218

Unknown Authors, “Kirishitan Monogatari,” 203.
Tokugawa Shogunate, “Excerpts from The Five-Household Group Laws”,
84.
219
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and those who believe in their
teachings to come aboard your ships.
If there is any violation, all of you
who are aboard will be considered
culpable. If there is anyone who
hides the fact that he is a Christian
and boards your ship, you may report
it to us. A substantial reward will be
given to you for this information. 220
This memorandum was addressed to Chinese and Dutch ships.
The bakufu clarified that foreigners could be Christian as long as
they did not propagate. However, this edict demonstrates the
bakufu’s main tool in rooting out Christianity was not officials or
even Buddhist temples but the civilian population itself. The threat
of punishment for failing to report Christians compelled the nonChristian population to take an active role in searching out
Christians within their own village or town.

The promise of

reward made compliance even more appealing.
The concept that everyone would suffer for the religious
beliefs on one individual drove a wedge between Japanese
Christians and non-Christians.

These Group Laws, and the

promised reprisals for disobeying them, severed the cultural ties
and communal spirit that had united the Shimabara and Amakusa
peasants regardless of religion. With these laws, commoners had
to fear their neighbor, not support them. Edicts like these helped
220

Tokugawa Shogunate, “Exclusion of the Portuguese (1939),” in Voices of
Early Modern Japan: Contemporary Accounts of Daily Life during the Age of
the Shoguns, ed. Constantine Vaporis (Oxford, England: Greenwood, 2012), 97.
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the Tokugawa government root out Christianity−and prevent the
disorder it could create−but also cut any ties of trust or fellowship
that could unite peasant families in a revolt.
However, the Tokugawa shogunate also understood the role
corrupt and incompetent daimyo played in inciting the Shimabara
Rebellion. Both Matsukura and Katataka were instructed to end
their lives in penance for failing to keep the peace. Future daimyo
were more incentivized to treat their peasants well, rather than risk
the humiliation of a revolt.

221

In this way, the shogunate

discouraged corruption and injustice, based on its risks of agitating
the populace and creating the necessary dissatisfaction for a revolt.
Although Group Laws kept villages divided and fearful of one
another, too much economic and political despotism would still
drive the peasantry together. As one abbot Kodo told the lord of
Kurume, cornered rats will even “bite the cat when driven to
extremity.” 222 Kodo’s statement, whether an invention of memory
or true, shows that the Tokugawa understand why peasants revolt
and seek to crush the causes for their discontent in addition to their
means to stage rebellions.

Corrupt and incompetent daimyo

threatened the stability of Tokugawa Japan as much as
Christianity. In order to avoid revolt and the resultant humiliation,
daimyo were pressured to practice fair taxation and law.
Later daimyo would employ a number of methods for
221
222

Fujita, “Persecution,” 186.
Burton, “Peasant Movements, 67.
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quelling peasant dissent. Some lords made concessions in order to
appease the peasantry.

Dete Masamune in Sendai cleverly

managed to both gain the peasantry’s support for his rule by
reducing the tax rate while also gaining more control over the
surplus agricultural production and maximum revenue by
broadening the tax base. 223 In Dete’s case, he avoided pushing the
peasant population to desperation and his concessions in the tax
rate kept the populace peaceful. Simultaneously, he also increased
his control and revenue from the agricultural farmland.

Other

lords employed speakers like Hosoi Heishu to pacify their peasant
populations. In 1783, Hosoi was hired by the daimyo of Owari to
mollify the peasantry, angered by poor living conditions worsened
by a bout of famine. 224 Hosoi’s allegorical sermon on the filial
promise of a young wife to her parents-in-law was intended to
remind the peasantry of their own duties to their lords and prevent
any plots of dissent or rebellion against the Owari daimyo. 225 The
sermon was widely popular and drew huge crowds.

In this

manner, the daimyo were able to broadcast their messages of
loyalty and moral behavior to a wide peasant population. Dete’s
manipulation of the tax base and Hosoi’s sermons illustrate how
223
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daimyo after the Shimabara Rebellion worked to pacify their
peasant populations while also gaining more control over them.
The Tokugawa shogunate strived for control over its
population. Especially in early years, with the tumultuous Warring
States years still fresh in the national memory, the shogunate
believed political domination and unflinching order as the only
path to peace. Arguably, the violent methods they employed to
subdue the peasantry and their daimyo prevented the outbreak of
an even more destructive and violent war between states. Driving
a wedge between the Christians and the rest of Japan, they took
away the ability for Christianity to become a rallying cry for
peasant revolt. Communities would remain divided by “fear of thy
neighbor,” and could not organize easily or harmoniously.
Furthermore, the rise of the Zen Buddhist temples as the religious
arm of the Tokugawa gave them tighter control over the personal
spiritual lives of its subjects. 226 Soto Zen temples monitored
parishioners in order to prohibit other religions independent of
Tokugawa control, especially Christianity and the Nichiren Fuju
Fuse. 227 These temples, much like the constant codes of conduct,
would advocate for appropriate behavior, knowing one’s place in
the social hierarchy, and submission to the daimyo and shogunate.
By demonstrating the penalty for failure, daimyo were pressured to
226
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minimize corruption and punishment in their domain, or to at least
formulate methods for placating or subduing the local population.
Bearable taxation and living conditions deterred many peasants
from resorting to open rebellion. The Tokugawa goal was to take
away both the cause and means of peasant rebellion, in order to
maintain peace in the realm.
Ohashi explored how memory and historical analysis
influenced the evolving narrative of the Shimabara Rebellion. In
early-modern Japan, Christian heresy and disruptive European
influences were emphasized and the despotism of the Shimabara
and Amakusa lords was placed in the background. 228

This

narrative justified, at least in their own eyes, Tokugawa
shogunate’s harsh persecution of Japanese Christians and their
expulsion of the Europeans. As a result, the Christian uprising
narrative dominated the early Japanese historical accounts and,
subsequently, the early European historians who used their work.
However, in later research, more historians recognized how the
Rebellion also demonstrated a struggle between peasants and lords,
on the grounds of political terrorism and economic oppression.
Ohashi contended that later historians focused more on social and
economic histories, though perhaps too narrowly. 229 Though they
had uncovered another driving cause for the Rebellion, they only
reordered the causes to place unbearable taxation and punishment
228
229
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as the primary cause and Christianity as a secondary. In order to
accurately understand the Shimabara Rebellion, Ohashi asserted
historians must stop resorting to an “either-or” binary debate. 230
Instead of contesting which cause had more influence, historians
should attempt to uncover the relationships between Christian
persecution and economic oppression and how they compounded
to explode into the Rebellion.
The Shimabara Rebellion occurred within a tradition of
socially cohesive groups of peasants resisting domination by their
lord. Influenced by resentment over religious persecution, outrage
over harsh punishments from the daimyo, and unbearable taxation,
the Rebellion was a desperate act by a peasantry left with few other
options to survive. Due to the strong communal ties between the
Kyushu peasantry, which included a substantial Japanese Christian
population, the Rebellion survived for four months and drove the
lords of Shimabara and Amakusa to humiliation and seppuku. The
Tokugawa shogunate’s response shows how these influences were
all vital to the Rebellion’s success, by trying to remove all these
factors, including Christianity, the local cultural alliances, and the
provocative corruption of incompetent daimyo. Instead of trying
to simplify the Shimabara Rebellion into a single-storied narrative,
historians must allow the Rebellion to exist as a complicated
historical event.

230
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